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What is a family? When asked to define family, many will include language to the effect that a “family is a group of people connected by blood or marriage or adoption.” Society and the law have recognized this “traditional” family model for centuries. It is a form family because it is a family that is “formed” by its connections through blood (biologically), marriage, or adoption.^[4]

Many might expand their definitions of family to include nonbiological relatives or non–legally related people who have a “household tie” to each other or work together as one group. This expanded definition of family can become legally unwieldy. Distinguishing the difference between a “group of people,” like students in a classroom who are working to define family but are not family by anyone’s definition, in comparison to legally recognizing a group of people as a family, is dependent on function. Generally, extending the definition to functional families requires that the members are together based on a commitment to each other while they operate and behave like form families.

Reading 2.1

Prince George’s County v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc.

49 Md. App. 314, 431 A. 2d 745 (M.d.App 1981)

County appealed from decision of the Circuit Court, Prince George’s County, James Magruder Rea, J., which granted cooperative housing development’s motion for summary judgment in county’s action to enforce order of the county human relations commission that development not discriminate against nonmarried couples. The Court of Special Appeals, Lowe, J., held that commission could not enforce order, under city ordinance outlawing housing discrimination based on marital status, restraining cooperative housing development from interpreting term “family” contained in mutual ownership contract to prohibit those couples not having legal marital status from living in the development since common-law marriages were not recognized in state as a legal status.

Judgment affirmed.

**746 LOWE, Judge.

Reluctant to plunge into the sea of matrimony, John Hemphill and Lynn Bradley were nonetheless eager to settle upon its shores. They had jointly contracted to purchase the right of “perpetual use and enjoyment” of a dwelling unit in a cooperative housing development known as Greenbelt Homes, Inc., situated in Prince George’s County. Because the contract was “subject to an acceptance of the purchaser by Greenbelt Homes, Inc. as members,” each applied for membership indicating on his application that they resided together and by the joint contract to purchase, inferentially intended to continue to do so in the dwelling unit described.

To their chagrin, they were denied membership “because (they) were not married.” According to their precipitous complaint to the Human Relations Commission of Prince George’s County, the spokesman for Greenbelt Homes, Inc., “said that in the past the Board (of Directors) has made exceptions to its policy of not selling to unmarried persons but never for an unmarried couple. He stated that not being married was the only reason for our rejection, that everything else was alright.”

Anxious to fulfill its destiny as destroyer of discrimination, the Commission made ready to do battle, apparently to *316 provide surcease for the sensitivities of those whom they clept “Complainants.”

The Complainants had not alleged that they had been deprived individually of membership, which under the by-laws stipulated that “Only one person per dwelling unit may be a member of the Corporation… .”

They were concerned solely with the “policy” of not selling to unmarried couples which stemmed from the provision in the by-laws that excepted from the individual membership restriction, “that a husband and wife or other persons specifically authorized in any case by the Board of Directors may hold a membership jointly.”

The Commission perceived discrimination from a different perspective. It noted that Greenbelt’s Mutual Ownership Contract contained a covenant that “The member shall occupy the dwelling unit covered by this contract as a private dwelling from the date of occupancy… for himself and his ­immediate family… .”

Focusing on the word “family” (while ignoring its immediately preceding restrictive adjective), the Commission rejected the “generally accepted” interpretation of “family” applied by Greenbelt Homes, and took “notice” that Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (1967 edition) listed a series of definitions for “family” broad enough to cover not only “(a) group of persons of common ancestry,” but also “a group of individuals living under one roof…,” a “group of things related by common characteristics,” “fellowship” and more pointedly, “A basic unit in society having as its nucleus two or more adults living together, and cooperating in the care and rearing of their own or adopted children.”

*317 The Commission also took “notice” that as 10.0 of the Prince George’s County Zoning Ordinance defines a family for housing occupancy purposes as, “An individual, or two or more persons related by blood or marriage, or a group of not more than five persons (excluding servants) not related by blood or marriage, living together as a single housekeeping group in a dwelling unit… .”

The Commission further concluded that “Greenbelt Homes, Inc.’s claim (The Board of Directors acting as Greenbelt Homes, Inc.) that their verbally expressed, only, interpretation of ‘family’ being ‘commonly accepted’ is not valid.”

It then held that Greenbelt’s covenant, so interpreted, contravened a local ordinance against discrimination which proscribed “acting, or failing to act, or unduly delaying any action regarding any person because of … marital status … in such a way that such person is adversely affected in the area(s) of housing… .” Prince George’s County Code, s 2-186(3).

**747 Caught up in the cause which by now seemingly surpassed its “complainants” (who we empirically note have since married and become ensconced elsewhere), the Commission ordered (among other things):

“That Greenbelt Homes, Inc. revise their (sic) Membership Agreement and their (sic) Mutual Ownership Contract to eliminate any provisions which are contrary to federal, state and/or local laws and/or ordinances.”

Our purpose in belaboring how the Commission arrived at its result is to emphasize by its omission that the Commission did not find that a covenant restricting membership to one’s immediate “family” as that term is *318 “COMMONLY ACCEPTED” WOULD HAVE BEEN discriminating because of marital status. It found only that the definition applied by Greenbelt to its covenant was invalid and implicitly should be defined as broadly as any of Webster’s alternatives, and at least as broadly as the Zoning Ordinance of which the Commission took “notice.”

Pursuant to s 2-197 of its Code, Prince George’s County filed suit for declaratory judgment and mandatory injunction in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County in equity to enforce the order of the Commission. Greenbelt Homes, Inc. answered and sought declaratory judgment as to the meaning of the terms “marital status” as used in the code and “family” as used in the Greenbelt covenants …

The case was submitted on motions for summary judgment by both parties; that of the County was denied and that of Greenbelt granted. In its opinion, which we shall accept as the requested declaration, (Reddick v. State, 213 Md. 18, 31, 130 A.2d 762 (1957)), the judge did not define “family” as requested. In defining “marital status,” however, he held that “People who are not married to one another do not have a marital status and for that reason it is clear that the legislative body did not intend for such to apply. If the County Council of Prince George’s County wants that intent, the ordinance should be amended to prohibit marital status ‘or lack thereof.’”

The issue raised on appeal by Prince George’s County is “whether the appellee’s practice of refusing to approve or enter into perpetual use agreements with unmarried heterosexual couples constitutes *319 marital status discrimination within the meaning of s 2-186(3), Prince George’s County Code?”

But the issue is not nearly so conceptually broad. When we reflect upon the Human Relations Commission Order, it is that foundation with which we find primary fault. If we addressed the question asked in isolation, a simple affirmance would support the result of the Court’s judgment but leave in limbo a highly questionable declaration which is the crux of this appeal. Significantly, Maryland’s statute with regard to “Discrimination in Housing” also makes it an unlawful practice to discriminate in regard to housing “because of … marital status” (Md.Ann.Code Art. 49B, s 20). A declaration regarding that term in context takes on added interpretative importance. It is noteworthy that the term “marital status” appears 100 times in the Annotated Code of Maryland scattered in some 31 different, although often related, sections. Since Judge Ross’ proclamation that “People who are not married to one another do not have a marital status …” is somewhat misleading, we will attempt to clarify the meaning of that term as used in the context of the housing discrimination law before addressing the Commission’s erroneous definition of “family” in its even more restrictive context in the covenant. See Md. Rule 1085.

Marital Status

Under the facts presented, we point out that neither complainant (each of whom **748 was “single,” “unmarried”) was denied membership individually because of his or her individual marital status. While each separately had a marital status, collectively they did not. Only marriage as prescribed by law can change the marital status of an individual to a new legal entity of husband and wife. The law of Maryland does not recognize common law marriages (Henderson v. Henderson, 199 Md. 449, 454, 87 A.2d 403 (1952), or other unions of two or more persons such as concubinage, *320 syneisaktism, relationships of homosexuals or lesbians as legally bestowing upon two people a legally cognizable marital status. Such relationships are simple illegitimate unions unrecognized, or in some instances condemned, by the law. That public policy message rings out from the procedural prerequisites for legitimating “marriages,” Md.Ann. Code Art. 62, and the statutory condemnation of other relationships, see, e.g., Md.Ann. Code Art. 27, s 18 (Bigamy) and ss 390 et seq. The obvious intent of our legislature is to encourage the proverbial concept that more belongs to a marriage than four bare legs in a bed.^[24] Even contemporary discrimination laws are not intended to promulgate promiscuity by favoring relationships unrecognized by statute or case law as having legal status.

Neither Mr. Hemphill nor Ms. Bradley was denied membership in Greenbelt Homes, Inc. because he or she was single. They were denied joint membership because neither Greenbelt nor the law of Maryland recognized their union as cloaking them with a “marital status.” Greenbelt simply refused to acknowledge that the naked emperor was wearing clothes. The complainants who were not then married may not compel treatment as an entity (e.g., as tenants by the entireties, see Lopez v. Lopez, 250 Md. 491, 510, 243 A.2d 588 (1968); and cf.

McManus, et al. v. Summers, 290 Md. 408, 430 A.2d 80 (1981)), any more than a married couple may be treated as single for preferential tax treatment, see e.g., Helvering v. Janney, 311 U.S. 189, 61 S.Ct. 241, 85 L.Ed. 118 (1940). We are what we are, and it is in that capacity which we must be judged even when we seek the judgment.

Family

The crux of the Commission’s order, however, was its finding that Greenbelt’s “commonly accepted” definition of the term “family” is invalid. The Commission held that the term “family” as used in the contractual covenant included as a matter of law at the very least the two *321 complainants, but interpretatively as many as “five persons … not related by blood or marriage, living together as a single housekeeping group in a dwelling unit,” which it gleaned from the local zoning ordinance.

The Court of Appeals has noted that the statutory use and definition of the word “family” may be (and often is) limited to the purposes of a specific act. Hicks v. Hatem, 265 Md. 260, 264 n. 1, 289 A.2d 325 (1972). In that case the Court of Appeals was interpreting the use of the term “family” in the household exclusion provision of insurance contract, just as we are here concerned with an exclusionary provision in a contract. There the Court agreed with Greenbelt’s observation of the “commonly accepted” interpretation of terms: “It would thus appear that in common parlance and usage the word ‘family’ more frequently connotes the existence of a marital or blood relationship, or a legal status approximating such relationship.” Id. at 264, 289 A.2d 325 (Emphasis added).

Noting that common law marriages are not recognized in Maryland as a “legal status,” the Court held that an unmarried woman living without consanguinal ties within an insured’s household did not “in this State” possess a legal status, which was the equivalent of being a “family” member. It would seem to follow that the Greenbelt covenant meant what Greenbelt intended it to mean, rather than what the Commission wanted it to mean. From at least as early as 1833, we are told that in construing covenants they must be viewed in context and in accordance with the intention of the covenantors. **749 See, Watchman v. Crook, 5 G & J 239 (1833) …

It is apparent that the Commission’s declaration of invalidity of Greenbelt’s definitional application of the term “family” was an error of law affecting its decision. Md.Ann. Code Art. 41, s 255(f)(4); or, if found as a fact, it was unsupported by competent material, and substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted. Md.Ann. Code Art. 41, s 255(f)(5). It follows that without regard to the judge’s rather broad definitional reasoning regarding the meaning of “marital status,” he did not err in refusing to enforce the defective order of the Commission at the insistence of the County.

Finally, we cannot conclude without noting that the Court of Appeals has given recognition sub silentio to the Greenbelt Homes, Inc. policy complained of by the original parties in this case as “never (authorizing joint membership) for an unmarried couple.” Although not written in either the light or the shadow of the recent influx of discrimination laws, the Court of Appeals was by no means offended by this same appellee’s termination of membership of a single woman who “persistently and grossly” violated her contract by (among other things) living with “an adult man” to whom she was related neither by blood nor marriage. The Court affirmed the termination of her interest for such “objectionable conduct.” Green v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc., 232 Md. 496, 194 A.2d 273 (1963).

Judgment Affirmed. Costs to be Paid By Appellant Prince George’s County.

Reading 2.2

Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co.

74 N.Y.2d 201, (1989)

Summary

Appeal, by permission of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department, from an order of that court, entered August 4, 1988, which (1) reversed, on the law, an order of the Supreme Court (Harold Baer, Jr., J.), entered in New York County, granting a motion by plaintiff for a preliminary injunction and enjoining defendant from evicting plaintiff from the apartment at which he currently resides, and (2) denied plaintiff’s motion. The following question was certified by the Appellate Division: “Was the order of this Court, which reversed the order of the Supreme Court, properly made?”

Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 143 AD2d 44, reversed.

Opinion of the court

Titone, J.

In this dispute over occupancy rights to a rent-controlled *206 apartment, the central question to be resolved on this request for preliminary injunctive relief (see, CPLR 6301) is whether appellant has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits (see, Grant Co. v. Srogi, 52 NY2d 496, 517) by showing that, as a matter of law, he is entitled to seek protection from eviction under New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations 9 NYCRR 2204.6 (d) (formerly New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations § 56 [d]). That regulation provides that upon the death of a rent-control tenant, the landlord may not dispossess “either the surviving spouse of the deceased tenant or some other member of the deceased tenant’s family who has been living with the tenant” (emphasis supplied). Resolution of this question requires this court to determine the meaning of the term “family” as it is used in this context.

I.

Appellant, Miguel Braschi, was living with Leslie Blanchard in a rent-controlled apartment located at 405 East 54th Street from the summer of 1975 until Blanchard’s death in September of 1986. In November of 1986, respondent, Stahl Associates Company, the owner of the apartment building, served a notice to cure on appellant contending that he was a mere licensee with no right to occupy the apartment since only Blanchard was the tenant of record. In December of 1986 respondent served appellant with a notice to terminate informing appellant that he had one month to vacate the apartment and that, if the apartment was not vacated, respondent would commence summary proceedings to evict him.

Appellant then initiated an action seeking a permanent injunction and a declaration of entitlement to occupy the apartment. By order to show cause appellant then moved for a preliminary injunction, pendente lite, enjoining respondent from evicting him until a court could determine whether he was a member of Blanchard’s family within the meaning of 9 NYCRR 2204.6 (d). After examining the nature of the relationship between the two men, Supreme Court concluded that appellant was a “family member” within the meaning of the regulation and, accordingly, that a preliminary injunction should be issued. The court based this decision on its finding that the long-term interdependent nature of the 10-year relationship between appellant and Blanchard “fulfills any definitional criteria of the term ‘family.’”

(1) The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that *207 section 2204.6 (d) provides noneviction protection only to “family members within traditional, legally recognized familial relationships” (143 AD2d 44, 45). Since appellant’s and Blanchard’ s relationship was not one given formal recognition by the law, the court held that appellant could not seek the protection of the noneviction ordinance. After denying the motion for preliminary injunctive relief, the Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to this court, certifying the following question of law: “Was the order of this Court, which reversed the order of the Supreme Court, properly made?” We now reverse [discussion of court’s reason for taking the case and statutory interpretation omitted by the author]…

III …

The present dispute arises because the term “family” is not defined in the rent-control code and the legislative history is devoid of any specific reference to the noneviction provision. All that is known is the legislative purpose underlying the enactment of the rent-control laws as a whole.

Rent control was enacted to address a “serious public emergency” created by “an acute shortage in dwellings,” which resulted in “speculative, unwarranted and abnormal increases in rents” (L 1946ch 274, codified, as amended, at McKinney’s Uncons Laws of NY § 8581 et seq). These measures were designed to regulate and control the housing market so as to “prevent exactions of unjust, unreasonable and oppressive rents and rental agreements and to forestall profiteering, speculation and other disruptive practices tending to produce threats to the public health * * * [and] to prevent uncertainty, hardship and dislocation” (id.). Although initially designed as an emergency measure to alleviate the housing shortage attributable to the end of World War II, “a serious public emergency continues to exist in the housing of a considerable number of persons” (id.) … Consequently, the Legislature has found it necessary to continually reenact the rent control *209 laws, thereby providing continued protection to tenants.

To accomplish its goals, the Legislature recognized that not only would rents have to be controlled, but that evictions would have to be regulated and controlled as well (id.)… .

… [R]espondent argues that the term “family member” as used in 9 NYCRR 2204.6 (d) should be construed, consistent with this State’s intestacy laws, to mean relationships of blood, consanguinity and adoption in order to effectuate the over-all goal of orderly succession to real property. Under this interpretation, only those entitled to inherit under the laws of intestacy would be afforded noneviction protection (see, EPTL 4-1.1). Further, as did the Appellate Division, respondent relies on our decision in Matter of Robert Paul P. (63 NY2d 233), arguing that since the relationship between appellant and Blanchard has not been accorded legal status by the Legislature, it is not entitled to the protections of section 2204.6 (d), which, according to the Appellate Division, applies only to “family members within traditional, legally recognized familial relationships” …

Respondent’s reliance on Matter of Robert Paul P. (supra) is also misplaced, since that case, which held that one adult cannot adopt another where none of the incidents of a filial relationship is evidenced or even remotely intended, was based solely on the purposes of the adoption laws (see, Domestic Relations Law § 110) and has no bearing on the proper interpretation of a provision in the rent-control laws …

Contrary to all of these arguments, we conclude that the term family, as used in 9 NYCRR 2204.6 (d), should not be rigidly restricted to those people who have formalized their relationship by obtaining, for instance, a marriage certificate or an adoption order. The intended protection against sudden eviction should not rest on fictitious legal distinctions or genetic history, but instead should find its foundation in the reality of family life. In the context of eviction, a more realistic, and certainly equally valid, view of a family includes two adult lifetime partners whose relationship is long term and characterized by an emotional and financial commitment and interdependence. This view comports both with our society’s traditional concept of “family” and with the expectations of individuals who live in such nuclear units (see also, 829 Seventh Ave. Co. v. Reider, 67 NY2d 930, 931–932 [interpreting 9 NYCRR 2204.6 (d)’s additional “living with” requirement to mean living with the named tenant “in a family unit, which in turn connotes an arrangement, whatever its duration, bearing some indicia of permanence or continuity” (emphasis supplied)]).
In fact, Webster’s Dictionary defines “family” first as “a group of people united by certain convictions or common affiliation” (Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 448 [1984]; see, Ballantine’s Law Dictionary 456 [3d ed. 1969] [“family” defined as “(p)rimarily, the collective body of persons who live in one house and under one head or management”]; Black’s Law Dictionary 543 [Special Deluxe 5th ed. 1979]). Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that, in using the term “family,” the Legislature intended to extend protection to those who reside in households having all of the normal familial characteristics. Appellant Braschi should therefore be afforded the opportunity to prove that he and Blanchard had such a household. *212

This definition of “family” is consistent with both of the competing purposes of the rent-control laws: the protection of individuals from sudden dislocation and the gradual transition to a free market system. Family members, whether or not related by blood, or law who have always treated the apartment as their family home will be protected against the hardship of eviction following the death of the named tenant, thereby furthering the Legislature’s goals of preventing dislocation and preserving family units which might otherwise be broken apart upon eviction. This approach will foster the transition from rent control to rent stabilization by drawing a distinction between those individuals who are, in fact, genuine family members, and those who are mere roommates (see, Real Property Law § 235-f; Yorkshire Towers Co. v. Harpster, 134 Misc 2d 384) or newly discovered relatives hoping to inherit the rent-controlled apartment after the existing tenant’sdeath.^[25]

The determination as to whether an individual is entitled to noneviction protection should be based upon an objective examination of the relationship of the parties. In making this assessment, the lower courts of this State have looked to a number of factors, including the exclusivity and longevity of the relationship, the level of emotional and financial commitment, the manner in which the parties have conducted their everyday lives and held themselves out to society, and the *213 reliance placed upon one another for daily family services (see, e.g., Athineos v. Thayer, NYLJ, Mar. 25, 1987, at 14, col 4 [Civ Ct, Kings County], affd NYLJ, Feb. 9, 1988, at 15, col 4 [App Term, 2d Dept] [orphan never formally adopted but lived in family home for 34 years]; 2–4 Realty Assocs. v Pittman, 137 Misc 2d 898, 902 [two men living in a “father-son” relationship for 25 years]; Zimmerman v. Burton, 107 Misc 2d 401, 404 [unmarried heterosexual life partner]; Rutar Co. v. Yoshito, No. 53042/79 [Civ Ct, NY County] [unmarried heterosexual life partner]; Gelman v. Castaneda, NYLJ, Oct. 22, 1986, at 13, col 1 [Civ Ct, NY County] [male life partners]). These factors are most helpful, although it should be emphasized that the presence or absence of one or more of them is not dispositive since it is the totality of the relationship as evidenced by the dedication, caring and self-sacrifice of the parties which should, in the final analysis, control. Appellant’s situation provides an example of how the rule should be applied.

Appellant and Blanchard lived together as permanent life partners for more than 10 years. They regarded one another, and were regarded by friends and family, as spouses. The two men’s families were aware of the nature of the relationship, and they regularly visited each other’s families and attended family functions together, as a couple. Even today, appellant continues to maintain a relationship with Blanchard’s niece, who considers him an uncle.

In addition to their interwoven social lives, appellant clearly considered the apartment his home. He lists the apartment as his address on his driver’s license and passport, and receives all his mail at the apartment address. Moreover, appellant’s tenancy was known to the building’s superintendent and doormen, who viewed the two men as a couple.

Financially, the two men shared all obligations including a household budget. The two were authorized signatories of three safe-deposit boxes, they maintained joint checking and savings accounts, and joint credit cards. In fact, rent was often paid with a check from their joint checking account. Additionally, Blanchard executed a power of attorney in appellant’s favor so that appellant could make necessary decisions—financial, medical and personal—for him during his illness. Finally, ­appellant was the named beneficiary of Blanchard’s life insurance policy, as well as the primary legatee and coexecutor of Blanchard’s estate. Hence, a court examining these facts could reasonably conclude that these men were much more than mere roommates. *214

In as much as this case is before us on a certified question, we conclude only that appellant has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, in that he is not excluded, as a matter of law, from seeking noneviction protection. Since all remaining issues are beyond this court’s scope of review, we remit this case to the Appellate Division so that it may exercise its discretionary powers in accordance with this decision.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and the case remitted to that court for a consideration of undetermined questions. The certified question should be answered in the negative.